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OFTEN WRONG, NEVER IN DOUBT: HOW ANTI-
ARBITRATION EXPECTANCY BIAS MAY LIMIT 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
Becky L. Jacobs* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is an honor to be a part of the Maine Law Review’s “Accessing Justice in 
Hard Times: Lessons from the Field, Looking to the Future” symposium issue.  Not 
only is the symposium’s theme particularly relevant in our current economic 
environment, it also provides those of us in the “Alternative Dispute Resolution” 
(ADR)1 field with an opportunity to reflect upon and return to the roots of our 
movement and to advance our cause and encourage others to join us. 
While there long have been “alternatives” to the traditional trial for those 
seeking to resolve disputes,2 the so-called “litigation explosion”3 in the 1970s 
inspired a campaign for reform of the administration of justice that resulted in the 
modern ADR movement.  The movement had many disparate goals, not the least of 
which was to improve public access to justice.4   At the historic 1976 National 
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice (Pound Conference), Harvard Law Professor Frank E.A. Sander first 
posited the concept of a “comprehensive justice center,” more famously referred to 
as a “multi-door courthouse,”5 in which a grievant’s dispute would be evaluated 
then directed to the most appropriate process or sequence of processes.6  “Room 3” 
in Professor Sander’s Multi-Door Courthouse/Dispute Resolution Center was listed 
in the lobby’s directory as Arbitration,7 the alternative process on which this 
Article will focus.   
The question that I pose herein is whether popular (mis)conceptions about 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.   The Author may be 
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 1. “Alternative Dispute Resolution” is a phrase most commonly associated with the acronym 
“ADR.”  There are those, however, who have suggested that the more accurate phrase might be 
“Appropriate Dispute Resolution,” a more inclusive phrase that describes the full panoply of dispute 
resolution options, including litigation. See, e.g., LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND 
LAWYERS 20-21 (4th ed. 2009); DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 17-20 (Douglas H. Yarn ed., 
1999). 
 2. For a survey of just a few of these methods, see STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 6-7 (5th ed. 2007). 
 3. See Thomas O. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329, 333 (2005). 
 4. See generally id. at 333 n.12 (citing, inter alia, Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to 
Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 181 
(1978); Russell G. Pearce et al., An Assessment of Alternative Strategies for Increasing Access to Legal 
Services, 90 YALE L.J. 122 (1980); BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE 
FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY (1977); Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 905, 906 (1979). 
 5. See A Dialogue between Professors Frank Sander and Mariana Hernandez Crespo Exploring 
the Evolution of the Multi-Door Courthouse, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 665, 665-67 (2008).  
 6. Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 64, 83-84 (A. Leo Levin and Russell Wheeler eds., 1979). 
 7. Sander, supra note 6. 
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arbitration may actually be preventing some of those who are most in need from 
receiving the legal relief they seek.  Before I reflect upon that query, however, a bit 
of background may be in order. 
II. ARBITRATION: THE PROCESS AND ITS PROGRESS 
Arbitration is a “method of dispute resolution involving one or more neutral 
third parties who are usu[ally] agreed to by the disputing parties and whose 
decision is binding.”8  The process has a storied historical pedigree, both in the 
United States and internationally.  Most people associate arbitration with the 
Judgment of Solomon, a reference to the biblical account of King Solomon’s 
decision to “split the baby” with a sword to settle a dispute between two women 
claiming to be the child’s mother.9  Ancient civilizations such as the Greek and 
Roman empires utilized arbitration to settle internal and external disagreements.10  
It also became popular in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries for specialized 
industries to resolve intra-industry disputes with arbitration.11  
However, while parties, industries, and nations have incorporated arbitration 
into their dispute resolution practices, courts were not always as receptive to the 
process.12  The conventional wisdom13 is that American courts, like their British 
common law counterparts, were hostile to arbitration agreements and were 
reluctant to enforce them.14  An oft-quoted passage by Justice Story is 
representative of this period of judicial hostility: 
One of the established principles of courts of equity is, not to entertain a bill for 
the specific performance of any agreement, where it is doubtful whether it may not 
thereby become the instrument of injustice, or to deprive parties of rights which 
they are otherwise fairly entitled to have protected. . . .  Now we all know, that 
arbitrators, at the common law, . . . are not ordinarily well enough acquainted with 
the principles of law or equity, to administer either effectually, in complicated 
cases . . . .  Ought then a court of equity to compel a resort to such a tribunal, by 
which, however honest and intelligent, it can in no case be clear that the real legal 
or equitable rights of the parties can be fully ascertained or perfectly protected?15 
New York was the first state to enact legislation to counter this perceived 
                                                                                                     
 8. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 112 (8th ed. 2004). 
 9. 1 Kings 3:16-28. 
 10. See ROBERT V. MASSEY, JR., W. VA. UNIV. EXTENSION SERV., INST. FOR LABOR STUDIES & 
RESEARCH, HISTORY OF ARBITRATION AND GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 
available at http:// www.wvu.edu/~exten/depts/ilsr/arbitration_history.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). 
 11. Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. 
L. REV. 39, 43 (1999). 
 12. See, e.g., Richard C. Rueben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 599-601 (1997). 
 13. Some scholars have questioned the widely-espoused notion of judicial hostility to arbitration.  
See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy, Misguided Fairness? Regulating Arbitration by Statute: Empirical 
Evidence of Declining Award Finality, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 551, 558-60 (2008). 
 14. Rueben, supra note 12, at 599-601. 
 15. Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (D. Mass. 1845). 
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judicial hostility,16 and the United States Congress followed shortly with the 
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA).17  The FAA was the expression of “a 
national policy favoring arbitration,”18 and it mandated enforcement of parties’ pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate.19  Pursuant to the FAA, Congress limited the role 
of the judiciary in the merits of contractually-agreed arbitration matters.20  The 
FAA served as the model for the Uniform Arbitration Act, promulgated in 1955 by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)21  
and enacted in some form or in its revised form in nearly every state in the nation.22 
Following the enactment of these affirmatory legislative developments and 
following a series of United States Supreme Court cases that expanded the scope of 
the FAA,23 arbitration clauses requiring that parties submit their disputes to binding 
arbitration became customary in contracts in a broad spectrum of settings.  For 
example, standard consumer contracts for credit cards and other consumer loans, 
product purchases, real estate, construction, utilities, auto and home insurance, and 
health care contain mandatory arbitration clauses.24  Sherman Act antitrust claims 
are arbitrable,25 as are disputes between and among investors, securities firms, and 
                                                                                                     
 16. 1920 N.Y. Laws 36.  See John R. Allison, Arbitration of Private Antitrust Claims in 
International Trade: A Study in the Subordination of National Interests to the Demands of a World 
Market, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 361, 371 (1986). 
 17. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-
16 (1999 & Supp. 2008)). 
 18. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).  See also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 19. See § 2, 43 Stat. at 883. 
 20. See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration’s Finality Through Functional 
Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 165 (2002). 
 21. Maureen A. Weston, Preserving the Federal Arbitration Act by Reining in Judicial Expansion 
and Mandatory Use, 8 NEV. L.J. 385, 388-89 (2007).  
 22. See Stanley A. Leasure & Kent P. Ragan, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Patient’s 
Dilemma and Doctor’s Delight?, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 51, 56 & n.38, 41 (2009).  Twenty-eight states and 
the District of Columbia have adopted the UAA, or some version thereof.  Id. at 56.  “The following 
states have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.”  Id. at 56 n.38.  Thirteen states have chosen the Revised 
Uniform Arbitration Act: Alaska, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Washington.  Uniform Law 
Commissioners, A Few Facts About the Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), available at 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-aa.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2010). 
 23. See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
489 U.S. 468 (1989); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); 
Southland, 465 U.S. 1. 
 24. See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer 
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008);  Mark Furletti, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA, 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY (2003), available at 
http://www.phil.frb.org/payment-cards-
center/events/workshops/2003/MandatoryArbitrationClauses_012003.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 25. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 616, 640. 
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individual investment advisors.26  Franchise contracts also frequently demand that 
disputes be resolved by arbitration.27   
In the workplace, mandatory pre-dispute resolution clauses often require that 
employees submit all claims arising from or related to their employment to 
compulsory arbitration, including statutory discrimination claims.28  In unionized 
workplace environments, arbitration has long been a fixture in dispute processing.29  
Collective bargaining agreements specify multi-step grievance procedures to 
resolve disputes, the vast majority of which culminate in binding arbitration.30  
Non-union employees also have been required by their employers to sign contracts 
containing pre-dispute arbitration clauses as a condition of their employment.31 
In spite, or perhaps because, of its pervasiveness, however, arbitration has 
become the focus of renewed hostility in the public, in courts, and in legislatures.  
                                                                                                     
 26. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is the largest independent regulator for 
U.S. securities firms.  Its website states that it “operates the largest dispute resolution forum in the 
securities industry to assist in the resolution of monetary and business disputes between and among 
investors, securities firms and individual registered representatives.”  FINRA – Arbitation & Mediation, 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/index.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).  See also Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (pre-dispute arbitration agreement for 
claims under the Securities Act of 1933 held to be enforceable); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (arbitration agreement for claims brought under section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 held to be enforceable); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 
(1974) (agreement to arbitrate disputes from international commercial transactions held to be 
enforceable). 
 27. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Clauses in Franchise Agreements: Common (and 
Uncommon) Terms, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 81, 81 (2002).   
 28. See Leona Green, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: A Public Policy 
Issue in Need of a Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173, 173 (1998).  In 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held 
that an employee's age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(ADEA) was subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause set forth in the 
employee's New York Stock Exchange registration application.  This holding has been expanded to 
require arbitration of employee federal discrimination claims pursuant to Title VII, section 1981, of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, and various other anti-discrimination laws, including the Equal Pay 
Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Rehabilitation Act.  Steven M. Warshawsky, Gilmer, the 
Contractual Exhaustion Doctrine, and Federal Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims, 19 LAB. 
LAW. 285, 294-95 & nn.79-85 (2004).  “Indeed, it is now well-established that all federal laws 
prohibiting workplace discrimination may be the subject of compulsory arbitration agreements.”  Id. at 
295.   
 29. Arbitration clauses contained in collective bargaining labor agreements were held enforceable 
pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C. § 185 (1998)) 
(LMRA), rather than the FAA.  See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 
448, 456 (1957).  See also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960); 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960); United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).  The United States 
Supreme Court recently confirmed that statutory discrimination claims submitted to arbitration by 
parties to a collective bargaining agreement are arbitrable.  14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 
1461 (2009). 
 30. See generally Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law 
Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2049-
50 (2009). 
 31. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Building the Civilization of Arbitration: Introduction, 113 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 983, 983-84 (2009). 
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This dissatisfaction with the process is not new; opponents of arbitration have 
lobbied for changes to the FAA or for “reform” legislation for many years.  These 
efforts have been focused on so-called “mandatory”32 pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in contracts between parties with unequal bargaining power, for 
example, employment and franchising agreements and those for consumer goods 
and services.33 
Reform legislation generally prohibiting enforcement of mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements in the context of all employment discrimination and other 
federal employment statutory claims has been proposed,34 as have bills that would 
specifically amend a number of federal civil rights statutes to preclude the 
enforcement of pre-mandatory arbitration provisions in pre-dispute agreements 
relating to claims arising under these statutes.35  Courts also have begun to more 
aggressively review arbitration agreements, using concepts such as 
unconscionability or public policy to refuse to enforce mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses.36 
These efforts to limit or restrict the imposition of mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration, however, have been “largely perfunctory.”37  It is only recently that 
they have gained traction, attributable, some have opined, to the composition of the 
new administration.38  As one Commentator so poetically described, “What 
otherwise might have been a tempest in a teacup has grown into a full fledged 
tornado.”39  Fueled by the rising tide of public anger in the wake of the economic 
crisis, opponents of arbitration forcefully have made their case, arguing, among 
                                                                                                     
 32. Some find the adjective “mandatory” to be inaccurate:   
What [others] call[ ] mandatory arbitration is better called contractual arbitration because 
it, unlike some other arbitration, does not occur unless the parties to the arbitration have 
previously formed a contract stating their agreement to arbitrate the dispute.  Arbitration 
is not mandatory when it arises out of a contract, because contracts are formed 
voluntarily.  The rare cases in which consent to a contract is involuntary—as when “A 
grasps B's hand and compels B by physical force to write his name” to the signature line 
of a contract, or when A puts a gun to B's head and says “sign or I'll shoot”—result in 
contracts that are voidable on the ground of duress.  In the absence of duress, it is 
inaccurate, as well as overly dramatic, to say that a contract containing an arbitration 
clause results in arbitration that is involuntary or mandatory.    
Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State Constitutional Jury-Trial 
Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 41 (2003) (footnotes omitted).  But see Jean R. Sternlight, In Defense of 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration (If Imposed on the Company), 8 NEV. L.J. 82, 82 n.1 (2007). 
 33. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 32, at 82-84. 
 34. Civil Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 5129, S. 2554, 110th Cong. § 423 (2008). 
 35. See Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 1489, S. 163, 107th Cong. (2001) 
(amending, inter alia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993). 
 36. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of 
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 757, 760-62 (2004). 
 37. Carbonneau, supra note 31, at 984. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Sandra D. Grannum, Securities Arbitration in the Market Meltdown Era: Achieving Fairness in 
Perception and Reality: The Faith and Face of Securities Arbitration After the 2008 Crash, 1754 PRAC. 
L. INST./CORP 111, 116 (2009). 
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other negative consequences, that mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in 
“adhesion” consumer product and services contracts and employment agreements 
are not the product of voluntary bargaining; that private arbitration is not a proper 
forum for the resolution of disputes implicating important civil rights; that 
arbitration requires individuals to surrender their right to a jury trial; and that 
arbitrators are captive to “repeat players” and produce unfair results.40   
The first proposal in response to this highly publicized anti-arbitration 
campaign was the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007,41 a “radical” amendment to the 
Federal Arbitration Act that would virtually eliminate the binding effect of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in contracts involving consumers, employees, and, to 
some degree, franchisees.42  More recently, two other proposals have surfaced.  The 
first, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 (AFA), would render pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements unenforceable for “an employment, consumer, or franchise 
dispute[,]” or “a dispute arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights.”43  
The second, the Consumer Fairness Act of 2009, would make pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts unenforceable as “an unfair and 
deceptive trade act or practice.”44   
Who could argue against such reforms, one might ask?  “As the bill’s title suggests, 
this reform movement is ultimately about fairness, and who can be against fairness?”45 
Most certainly, these concerns not only are valid, but also are, on the whole I 
believe, well-intentioned,46 and it seemingly has been difficult for arbitration’s defenders 
to mount an effective rebuttal without appearing to be out to get the “little guy”47 and to 
                                                                                                     
 40. See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration 
Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 267 (2008); Recent Proposed Legislation, 
Arbitration—Congress Considers Bill to Invalidate Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses for Consumers, 
Employees, and Franchisees—Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007), 121 
HARV. L. REV. 2262, 2264-65 (2008). 
 41. S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 42. See Rutledge, supra note 40, at 267-68. 
 43. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009). 
 44. Consumer Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 991, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). 
 45. Rutledge, supra note 40, at 267. 
 46. But see Carbonneau, supra note 31, at 984-85.  Professor Carbonneau asserts that some 
arguments posited by anti-arbitration advocates are disingenuous:  
[T]he anti-arbitration sentiment in the U.S. Congress has been fueled and financed by the 
American Trial Lawyers' Association (ATLA) and encouraged by other lobbyist groups, 
like Public Citizen.  While all the opponents of arbitration pay reverence to the 
Constitution and to the sanctity of legal rights, . . . [and] a proclaimed concern for 
disadvantaged parties and their plight in society[,] . . . [t]he virulence of the critics is 
motivated by the need to control the measure and implementation of the rule of law; it is 
not a concern about the rule of law itself.  In the final analysis, the interests of the average 
citizen are irrelevant; what is truly important is who decides how society is governed and 
who controls the administration of justice.   
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 47. Professor Jean R. Sternlight has used the phrase “little guys” to describe “consumers, lower 
level employees, and perhaps certain franchisees and small businesses that could not be expected to 
knowingly and voluntarily negotiate arbitration clauses in advance.”  Sternlight, supra note 32, at 82 n.3 
(citing Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for 
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. QUARTERLY. 637, 637-39 (1996)).  
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be wholly biased in favor of “big business.”48  Yet, one must ask whether these very 
passionate anti-arbitration claims are as clear cut as those making them would have the 
public believe.  Are they supported by overwhelmingly irrefutable data demonstrating 
the nefariously inflicted harm to the “little guys” that the legislation is designed to 
protect? 
III. ARBITRATION: THE PERCEPTION 
To be clear, I am not advocating for or against the reforms embodied in the 
AFA.  However, I would like to take a step back from the inflammatory rhetoric49 
with which we all are being bombarded and consider whether at least some of the 
arbitration reform advocacy may be based upon the expectancy bias of the 
advocates.  In psychology and cognitive science, expectancy bias, a form of 
confirmation or confirmatory bias, is the tendency to search for or interpret data in 
such a way that supports one’s preconceptions, beliefs, expectations, or hypotheses 
and to discount information that would disconfirm these existing opinions.50 
Studies indicate that the public generally has a strongly negative opinion of 
arbitration and perceives it to be an unfair process.51  Yet, this perception does not 
appear to be unequivocally supported by available empirical data on arbitral 
results52 across a variety of subject matter disputes53 and disputants, including those 
involving consumers,54 individual investors,55 and employees.56 
                                                                                                     
 48. Cf. Sternlight, supra note 32, at 83-84. 
 49. Consider, for example, the language of Public Citizen’s advocacy: “Forced arbitration creates a 
systemic bias in favor of businesses while offering few, if any, meaningful deterrents against negligence 
or even foul play.”  ZACHARY GIMA ET AL., PUBLIC CITIZEN, FORCED ARBITRATION: UNFAIR AND 
EVERYWHERE 4 (2009), http://www.citizen.org/documents/UnfairAndEverywhere.pdf [hereinafter 
PUBLIC CITIZEN, FORCED ARBITRATION]. 
 50. See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises, 2  REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).  See also Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The 
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 309-16.  
 51. See Sarah Rudolph Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The Current State of Consumer Arbitration, 15 
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 30, 33 (2008).  But see Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 549, 560-62 (2008) (surveys of actual participants in arbitral proceedings across a variety of 
industries report positive attitudes about the process and its fairness). 
 52. This Author does not purport to engage in a thorough evaluation of these data, and an 
exhaustive analysis thereof is beyond the scope of this Article.  As the prominent arbitration scholar 
Professor Peter B. Rutledge has opined, a meaningful analysis of whether arbitration produces “good” 
results really involves two distinct inquiries.  First, how should arbitral outcomes be measured?  Once 
this normative question is resolved, the second question is: What do the data reveal?  Email from Peter 
B. Rutledge, Associate Professor, Univ. of Ga. Law School, to Becky L. Jacobs, Associate Professor, 
Univ. of Tennessee College of Law (Oct. 26, 2009) (on file with author).  My brief discussion conflates 
these two inquiries, as do many of the available data analyses on arbitral results.  This is not a merely 
academic issue.  Not only may expectancy bias influence data interpretation, it also can creep into study 
design, and it hampers an intelligent and coherent public debate on arbitration’s future. 
 53. See generally Rutledge, supra note 51. 
 54. See Cole & Frank, supra note 51, at 33. 
 55. See JILL I. GROSS & BARBARA BLACK , UNIV. OF CINCINNATI COLLEGE OF LAW, PERCEPTIONS 
OF FAIRNESS OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 59 (2008), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090969 (last visited Jan. 23, 2010). 
 56. See Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Reform: What We Know and What We Need To Know, 10 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 579, 582-83 (2009). 
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Consider consumer debt arbitrations, the focus of much recent controversy and 
study.  A widely-cited report by the advocacy group Public Citizen concluded that 
arbitrators in consumer debt arbitrations are “[b]iased decision-makers” who 
essentially “rubber-stamp[] corporate claims” and produce “[s]tunning results that 
disfavor consumers” in 94 percent of cases.57  However, critical analysis of the data 
presented by Public Citizen to support these conclusions yielded a far different set 
of statistics, reporting that “consumers had at least partial success in 48.5 percent of 
the cases in Public Citizen’s data set, a far cry from the [one-sided] business 
success rate portrayed in Public Citizen’s report.”58  Other data examination 
support the conclusion that Public Citizen’s report misleadingly overstates the 
situation,59 including one analysis of 2006 consumer-filed cases administered by 
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) that calculated an 81 percent 
favorable outcome for the consumer through either an outright winning award or a 
voluntary settlement.60 
These success rates compare favorably to results in consumer litigation.  
Comparative data demonstrate that consumers bringing arbitration claims against 
businesses prevail in 65.5 percent of cases that reach a decision, and the median 
duration from initial filing to final disposition is 4.35 months.61  In court, buyer 
plaintiffs litigating contract claims prevailed 61.5 percent of the time, 60.9 percent 
in cases decided by bench trials, and with a median “filing to final” duration of 
19.4 months.62 
In securities arbitration, the disparity between perception and “reality” also 
appears to be prevalent.  While investors held strongly negative perceptions of both 
the arbitration process and of the bias of arbitrators before they even filed a claim 
leading to arbitration,63 analyses of securities arbitral awards provide that, in 2009, 
investors were awarded damages in 45 percent of cases.64  According to these data, 
investors received a monetary or non-monetary recovery in approximately 70 
percent of customer claimant cases, through settlements or awards.65  Attempting to 
compare arbitral and judicial win/loss results in the securities context is difficult for 
a number of reasons.  These reasons include (1) the differences between the 
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 58. Cole & Frank, supra note 51, at 32. 
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arbitration and litigation processes, (2) the limited number of retail investor cases 
decided through litigation, and (3) the data that demonstrate that 25 percent of all 
investor claims are for less than $10,000 and, therefore, not cost effective to 
litigate.66  However, one older study reported that an average of 60 percent of 
investors received an award in securities arbitration; 39 percent of investors 
received favorable results in the very few cases that were decided in court.67  
Employment cases follow this same expectancy bias pattern.  While many 
believe that “[f]orced arbitration clauses effectively allow employers to shield 
themselves from the purview [of] employment laws,”68 the data once again do not 
conclusively support this contention.  Data analysis of all of the employment cases 
administered by the AAA in 2006 yielded a 77 percent success rate for 
employees.69  While studies of other data sets yielded lower rates,70 the aggregate 
arbitral data71 compare favorably to the litigation alternative.72  A study by the 
National Workrights Institute reported that, overall, employees prevailed 62 
percent of the time in arbitration, while they had a 43 percent win rate in court.73 
While you know what they say about statistics,74 and about how reactive 
devaluation might impact what they say about these statistics,75 these data do 
suggest that expectancy bias plays at least some role in the overwhelmingly 
negative perception that many have of the arbitration process. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the “objective” reality of the fairness or lack thereof of 
arbitration, negative perceptions of the process already are “transform[ing] the 
reality faced by policy-makers”76 and influencing the development of the law 
regarding arbitration.  For example, the AAA no longer will accept certain new 
consumer debt collection arbitration filings,77 and, as part of a settlement with the 
Office of the Minnesota Attorney General, the National Arbitration Forum will stop 
accepting or participating in the processing or administration of any new consumer 
arbitrations.78  Additionally, Bank of America and J.P. Morgan Chase have 
dropped mandatory arbitration for credit card customers, and, in Bank of America’s 
case, for bank account holders.79  Other credit card companies, such as American 
Express, have indicated that they are monitoring their arbitration practices.80 
While anti-arbitration advocates cheer these developments and continue their 
campaigns to further restrict the use of arbitration, others predict that limiting 
access to arbitration may in some instances be limiting access to justice for many 
claimants, in many settings.81  Consumers and employees with modest financial 
claims may find it impossible to afford or locate counsel willing to represent them, 
and they may not have the time or funding for lengthy court proceedings.82  
Furthermore, even if arbitration remains a viable dispute resolution option, negative 
public expectancy bias may prevent consumers, employees, and other similar 
disputants from even considering its use. 
As Voltaire warned, perfect is the enemy of good, and, in this situation, a 
favorable result in a “good” process for a consumer, employee, or franchisee may 
be infinitely better than little or no recourse at all.83  If prohibitions or sweeping 
restrictions on pre-dispute arbitral requirements have even the potential to harm the 
very parties that anti-arbitration advocates claim to be seeking to protect, must 
reform be an all or nothing proposition?  Even its most staunch and persistent 
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critics do not recommend that arbitration be abandoned under all circumstances.84  
The process for reform should model the very values that arbitral reformists claim 
to seek and should provide an objective, unbiased, and deliberate evaluation of all 
available data, regardless of its source.  Decision-makers should eschew, even 
denounce, the polemic rhetoric lest it reinforce any public negative expectancy bias 
and potentially deny access to justice to those most in need. 
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